The massive downsizing of the state-owned sector and the concomitant impressive growth of the private sector at the end of the 1990s have altered the nature of the Chinese labor market. The introduction of market mechanisms has contributed to increasing labor turnover and competitiveness in market wages. Using two urban household surveys for 1995 and 2002, this paper analyzes the evolution of labor market segmentation in urban China by applying an extended version of Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition methods. During the seven-year period, the sharp increase in real earnings for all workers shows substantial differences across ownership, economic sectors, and regions. We find strong evidence of a multitiered labor market along these three major lines and highlight increasing segmentation within each of the three dimensions, with the gap between the privileged segments of the labor market and the most competitive segments widening over time.
Introduction
Since the launching of the policy of reform and opening up in the late 1970s, both rural and urban labor markets in China have changed dramatically. By allowing market mechanisms to play a greater role in wage setting and labor mobility to reappear, economic liberalization has revived incentive mechanisms and improved the efªciency of labor allocation across sectors, enterprises, and regions. 1 Overall, the basic patterns in urban employment that have emerged are related to enterprise ownership, sector, and regional location. First, urban unemployment mainly comes from urban state-owned industrial enterprises. While total employment in urban areas has increased over the years, employment in state-owned units has steadily decreased since the mid-1990s, from 112.6 million in 1995 down to 70 million in 2004. The reduction of employment in state-owned and collectively owned units has been partly compensated for by the increase of employment in the private sector, the foreign sector, and new enterprise ownership types. 5 Second, the sharp decrease in employment mainly took place in the most competitive sectors, such as manufacturing, where the number of employed people dropped by 15 percent between 1995 and 2002. 6 In contrast, banking and insurance, and real estate, sectors with a state monopoly status, increased their employment by 23 percent and 48 percent, respectively, over the same period. Third, the regional distribution of urban employment and unemployment is also quite uneven. Northeast provinces, which have been among the hardest-hit provinces by the layoff policy, are those that experienced the sharpest drop in urban employment between 1995 and 2002 (by 28 percent). In other regions, the employment level has remained the same, except in the western region, where the share of total urban employment has increased from 18 to 21 percent.
set derived from two urban household surveys conducted by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, which provide detailed information on labor income as well as on individual and household characteristics for urban hukou holders in 1995 and 2002.
To assess the extent of labor market segmentation, we ªrst estimate Mincerian earnings equations for each category of enterprises (deªned by ownership, sector, or location). We then propose an extended form of Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition methodology to decompose for each dimension the observed earnings differentials into three components: the distribution of individual characteristics, differences in working time, and what can be interpreted as a pure "segment effect." Comparisons of segmentation magnitudes across ownership, sector, and region and between the two years are expected to provide a broader view on recent changes across the various segments of the Chinese urban labor market.
Major reforms in China's urban labor market
During the pre-reform period, there was virtually no labor market in China. Job allocation and wage-settings in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were determined within the central plan, and a key function held by SOEs was to provide employment to the entire working-age population. The main features of this centrally determined wage structure were the following. 8 First, the wage determination system was characterized by rigidity, with low-level wages and a distribution of wages based on an egalitarian principle. Promotion and wage increases were mostly driven by seniority. Second, not only were SOEs labor providers, but they also provided a number of social welfare beneªts, including housing, medical care, and pensions, which aimed at compensating for low base wages. Third, with the employment assignment system and the strictly controlled movement of the population within the hukou system, labor mobility across sectors and regions was strongly limited.
Economic reforms launched from the end of the 1970s led to important changes within the state sector (table 1) . In a ªrst step, more autonomy in decision making for employment and wages was granted to SOEs' managers, who were now allowed to retain a share of their proªt and use it to give bonus wages to their employees. Bonus wages aimed to provide incentives to employees and increase the overall productivity of SOEs. Their amount was also meant to reºect both enterprise and individual performances (Coady and Wang 2000; Meng 2000) . However, given high supervision costs, bonuses have often been distributed on an egalitarian basis within work units, and the evaluation of their impact remains controversial. 1978 Introduction of a retirement system in urban areas (60 years old for men/50 years old for women with no less than 10 years of working experience). a
The industrial reforms also allowed the emergence of a new private sector, composed of domestic private enterprises, 9 individual enterprises (getihu), domestic joint ventures (lianying qiye), foreign-invested enterprises, and shareholding companies (gufenzhi qiye). Although domestic private enterprises suffered from restrictive policies such as overtax, strict regulation, and limited access to loans and skilled employees in the 1980s, the share of the nonpublic sector in employment grew steadily from zero in 1978 to 17 percent in 1995, 45 percent in 2002, and 53 percent in 2004. 10 Starting from the mid-1990s, other important changes have taken place in the Chinese urban labor market, the most radical being the layoff policy (xiagang) implemented in state-owned and urban collective enterprises, ªrst in Shanghai only in 1993 and then extended nationwide in 1997. Given the growing burden of substantial redundant labor in the state sector, the goal of this policy was to lay off a quarter or more of the state sector's workers within four years (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (Appleton et al. 2002) . This policy has had a strong impact on employment in the public sector, which fell from 112.6 million in 1995 to 71.6 million in 2002 in SOEs and from 31.5 million to 11.2 million over the same period in urban collective enterprises.
The second most important change is wage reform, which was launched in 1994 and grants enterprises more autonomy in setting wages and bonuses. Consequently, the average wage in the state-owned sector has increased substantially, especially in the government sector. Between 1998 and 2002, average earnings in state-owned units have grown by 107 percent in real terms, with an annual growth rate of 10.9 percent. In 1988, the State Council issued the Tentative Stipulations on Private Enterprises (TSPE) to govern the registration and management of private ªrms. This document deªned a private ªrm as "a for-proªt organization that is owned by individuals and employs more than eight people." Firms that employ eight employees or fewer can be registered as individual enterprises (getihu). The TSPE identiªed three types of private ªrms: those under sole ownership, partnerships, and limited-liability companies.
However, the wage reform has also widened the earnings gap between workers and managers, between skilled workers and unskilled workers, and between enterprises making proªts and those taking losses. During the last two years of Zhu Rongji's administration, salaries in the government sector were raised again by 60 percent, in order to narrow the income gap between civil servants and white-collar workers employed in the nonpublic sector.
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The last major change on the Chinese urban labor market over 1995-2002 is related to rural-urban migration. The policy of city governments in regard to rural migration varies, but the general trend is that employment policies concerning rural migrants were tight up to the end of the 1990s and started to relax at the beginning of the new century. 12 The participation of rural migrants in the urban labor market has had a great impact on wage levels and unemployment among employees with urban hukou. Rural migrant laborers compete heavily with local urban workers for unskilled jobs, and this puts pressure on the wage level for unskilled workers in the urban labor market, particularly for those enterprises whose wage setting is the most strongly related to market mechanisms (Cai 2005; Li and Bai 2005) .
A ªrst look at the data

Data
The data used in this paper come from two nationally representative household income surveys for 1995 and 2002. The surveys are part of the China Household Income Project (CHIP), coordinated by the Institute of Economics and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, with assistance from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). 13 Household samples were drawn from the large sample used by the NBS. 14 The two urban surveys cover the same provinces and cities and almost the same 64 Asian Economic Papers
Economic Liberalization with Rising Segmentation in China's Urban Labor Market 11 The second objective of this wage adjustment was to stimulate sluggish economic growth. However, while the relative wage in the government sector rose signiªcantly, the macroeconomic effect of the wage adjustment remained quite limited.
12 In 1998, the Ministry of Public Security issued new regulations relaxing control over hukou registration. In particular, those who join their parents, spouses, and children in cities can now be registered with urban hukou (Cai and Wang 2003) .
13 The China Household Income Project is an internationally joint research project established in 1987 and sponsored by the Institute of Economics, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the Asian Development Bank, and the Ford Foundation. Additional support was provided by the East Asian Institute and Columbia University (Riskin, Zhao, and Li 2000) . To date, three household income surveys have been conducted : 1988, 1995, and 2002 . The output of the project based on the ªrst two surveys can be found in Grifªn and Zhao (1993) and Riskin, Zhao, and Li (2001) .
number of households. 15 Although the number of samples in each province is not exactly proportional to its actual population, the two statistics are highly correlated, with more households being selected from more populated provinces. The 1995 urban data include 6,931 households and 21,694 individuals, and the 2002 urban data 6,835 households and 20,632 individuals. The distribution of households among provinces is shown in table 2.
The two urban surveys cover only urban hukou holders and thus exclude a potentially important segment of the urban labor market: rural-urban migrants. In a changing environment in which rural-urban migration is gathering momentum, limiting our study to urban residents might be misleading. We acknowledge this potential shortcoming in our study, which does not allow for the evaluation of how migration is affecting the urban labor market and wage differentials.
Our sample is restricted to individuals aged 16 to 60 who declared working at least part of the year and earning (positive) wages. Owners of private or individual enterprises are not considered here, since wages cannot be disentangled from proªt in their case. Laid-off workers are also excluded, which leaves us with a sample of 10,898 employees in 1995 and 9,537 employees in 2002.
The earnings variable is deªned as the sum of cash labor compensations and income in kind. Cash labor compensations include basic salary as well as bonuses, allowances (except those given while "waiting for a job," xiagang) and subsidies (including housing, medical, child care, and regional subsidies), other wages (including Beijing  1  500  1  500  Shanxi  7  650  7  650  Liaoning  5  700  5  700  Jiangsu  9  800  9  750  Anhui  6  500  6  500  Henan  8  600  8  700  Hubei  7  742  7  700  Guangdong  8  546  8  550  Chongqing  --2  300  Sichuan  7  848  6  600  Yunnan  9  648  8  650  Gansu  3  400  3 overtime wages and wages for special circumstances), and other income from the work unit (except hardship allowances). Hence, our earnings variable includes some nonmonetary beneªts (e.g., housing, medical care, child care, and regional subsidies), although it does not fully account for all fringe beneªts provided by the public sector (such as implicit contribution to pensions, health insurance, or preferential housing rents). Finally, hourly earnings are deªned as the ratio of earnings to the number of declared hours worked in a year.
An important component of earnings differentials in China may lie in differences in living standards among different cities. To account at least partially for this factor, earnings are adjusted for provincial purchasing power differences by using Brandt and Holz's (2006) urban provincial-level spatial price deºators (the reference being nationwide prices in 2002). In the analysis presented below, earnings are thus expressed in "interprovincial purchasing power parity," which we believe can be considered more comparable than the nondeºated data usually considered in the literature. Among the consequences of using this purchasing power parity adjustment is that it leads to a reduction in earnings differentials between some regions as compared to the ofªcial NBS China Statistical Yearbook data. 16 This is especially the case for the comparison between municipalities and other regions, since the cost of living in municipalities is much higher.
We focus on the evolution of earnings differentials in various components of the labor market and consider three different dimensions, namely, ownership, economic sector, and geographical location, for each of which we deªne several categories. The third economic sector considered here, public services, includes health care, sport and social welfare, education, culture and arts, and scientiªc research. We separate public services from government agencies in the sector dimension because they are different in terms of wage setting. Indeed, while government agencies' wages are paid only by the government, public services can get additional funding from the market, which may substantially affect wage-setting behaviors.
Some economic sectors (mining, geological prospecting, and irrigation administration; transportation, storage, post ofªce, and communication; and social services) could not be clearly classiªed as deªned above. We omitted these sectors from our analysis.
For the third dimension, geographical location, we have ªve regions: coast, center, west, northeast, and municipalities. As the household income surveys do not cover all Chinese provinces, the ªve regions are represented by a subsample of provinces. There is some inconsistency for the deªnition of "real estate" between 1995 and 2002. Indeed, in 1995, "real estate" also includes "social services" (such as law companies, housekeepers, and reemployment centers), while in 2002, these are split into two separate categories. We chose not to add up these two categories for 2002, since social services are mostly competitive. However, we believe that the bias resulting from including social services in real estate in 1995 should not be too large, since this sector was still marginal in 1995.
18 For our purposes, it is more appropriate to consider Liaoning's characteristics as representative of a ªfth category of provinces, namely, northeastern provinces, rather than coastal provinces. Indeed, Liaoning province is quite different from coastal provinces in terms of industrial and ownership structure. Its industrial structure is strongly inºuenced by strategic choices that have been made during the central-planning period, with a predominance of heavy industry sectors, and thus central SOEs. Moreover, it has been one of the most badly hit provinces by the layoff policy since the end of the 1990s, which has had strong implications in terms of employment structure. Ideally, we would like to consider the three dimensions highlighted above simultaneously, since they are obviously correlated. Among the most prominent correlations, table 3 shows that (1) oligopolistic sectors mostly consist of SOEs and GAIs, (2) private and foreign enterprises are mainly found in the competitive sector as well as in the coastal region, and (3) SOEs are over-represented in the northeast region. However, for practical reasons, it is not possible to consider the three dimensions together. This is because the methodology requires the estimation of earnings equations by subcategories, and if we were to consider each subcategory (e.g., SOEs in the competitive sector in the coastal region), we would have too few observations. Consequently, in the following analysis, the three dimensions will be analyzed separately, keeping in mind that they are overlapping.
The main characteristics of employees by dimension and over time are shown in tables 4, 5, and 6. A ªrst general comment on the evolution between 1995 and 2002 is that both average age and education level increased over time, while the share of long-term contracts sharply decreased, from 96 percent to below 80 percent. Comparisons by ownership (table 4) show that government agencies and foreigninvested enterprises employed better-educated workers than other sectors in 1995 and 2002. As compared with private and foreign sectors, workers in the public sector were older and more often party members, with long-term tenure, but they were less likely to be located in coastal provinces. It is noteworthy that the most educated workers were found in public administration, with an average number of years of education (above 12) much higher than in any other type of enterprise for 1995 and 2002. Finally, the regional distribution of the private sector equalized over time, which may reºect the development of the private sector at the turn of the century all over China, including inland provinces.
As for differences by sectors ( coastal provinces were less educated and less likely to be party members (with a lower share of SOEs), which may be consistent with the non-skilled, labor-intensive, outward-oriented, light industrial structure of these provinces. For the northeast region, the downsizing of the state-owned sector was particularly large between 1995 and 2002; the 63 percent share of employment in SOEs in 2002 was the lowest across regions. The share of employees with long-term contracts also dropped most radically in the northeast, from the highest in 1995 (nearly 98 percent) to the lowest in 2002 (64 percent).
The evolution of earnings differentials by categories
Descriptive statistics on earnings differentials and earnings composition across the three dimensions are given in tables 7, 8, and 9. 19 In terms of ownership (table 7) 19 All the data discussed in the remainder of this paper are deºated, using Brandt and Holz's (2006) urban provincial-level spatial price deºators as explained above.
seen their relative position deteriorating, the largest gap with other enterprises jumping from 67 to 78 percent and 57 to 64 percent, respectively, between 1995 and 2002.
In terms of economic sectors (table 8) , the difference between the competitive and the noncompetitive sectors (oligopolistic, public services, and government) has grown larger over time, with the earnings gap in favor of noncompetitive sectors increasing from a range of 10-17 percent to 48-63 percent. A somewhat similar change, though with much lower amplitude, has also taken place across noncompetitive sectors, with the largest gap between two noncompetitive sectors increasing from 6 percent in 1995 to 10 percent in 2002. Brandt and Holz (2006) .
Base nationwide prices in 2002. The gap with average earnings is calculated as average total earnings for enterprise category i divided by average total earnings for all categories of enterprises (reported in column 1). Ownership categories are state-owned enterprises (SOEs), urban collective enterprises (UCEs), private or individual enterprises (PIEs), foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs), and government agencies or institutions (GAIs). c.v. coefficient of variation.
Furthermore, coefªcients of variation on total earnings indicate a more equitable distribution of earnings in the public sector (SOEs and GAIs) as compared to the private/competitive sectors for both years. The earnings composition has also changed over time, the most notable change being the sharp reduction in the share of subsidies provided by SOEs (which comes from a 50 percent reduction of the absolute amount in SOEs). Consequently, while the public sector was offering much higher subsidies than the private sector in 1995, this was no longer the case in 2002, except in public administration.
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At the beginning of economic reform, the earnings difference between coastal provinces and inner provinces was extremely small. Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang) and 666 yuan in the eight coastal provinces (Tianjin, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, and Guangdong) (NBS 1999, 139) .
spite a reduction in the number of hours worked in both private or individual enterprises and foreign-invested enterprises in 2002. The comparison across economic sectors conªrms that workers in public services and in government agencies work less, but it also shows that working time in the competitive sector has increased over time while it has decreased in the oligopolistic sector, leading to a quite important gap between competitive and noncompetitive sectors in 2002 (about 4 hours per week). Regional comparisons do not reveal strong differences in working time across regions, except for a sizeable reduction in hours worked in municipalities between 1995 and 2002, which is not observed in other regions.
Methodology
In order to analyze earnings differentials between individuals belonging to different segments in the labor market (across ownership, sector, or region), we use an extended version of Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions (Blinder 1973; Oaxaca 1973) to evaluate the contribution of three complementary factors: differences in mean endowments of workers across segments, differences in hours worked, and a pure "segment effect." 
Modeling total earnings
The total individual income (I) derived from segment s can be expressed as 
This decomposition provides an evaluation of what would be the observed average earnings gap under the following conditions:
1. If workers observed in different categories were facing the same conditions in the determination of remuneration and of hours worked, the wage difference reºects pure difference-in-endowments effect. 2. If workers observed in different categories were facing the same conditions in the determination of remuneration and were endowed with the same characteristics, the wage difference reºects pure difference-in-hours-worked effect. 3. If workers observed in different categories were facing the same conditions in the determination of hours worked and were endowed with the same characteristics, the wage difference reºects pure "segment effect."
Implementation and robustness issues
The practical implementation of the method consists of three steps. First, earnings equations and hours-worked equations are estimated separately for each segment (see appendixes A and B). Second, estimated coefªcients are used to predict hourly earnings and hours worked for each individual and each segment. Third, each of the effects presented in equation (4) is evaluated by averaging over individuals the corresponding observed or counterfactual earnings values.
Earnings equations Decomposition results presented below correspond to the speciªcation for earnings equation estimations detailed in appendixes A and B. The common explanatory variables for hourly earnings functions are effective number of years of education; a dummy variable designating whether the individual has received vocational education; effective years of work experience and the square of this variable; a dummy variable for "big cities"; and a dummy variable for acquisition of the current urban residence permit (hukou). Regional dummies are used as additional explanatory variables in the ownership and sector dimensions.
Selectivity bias in enterprise type and industrial sector choices may affect the estimated coefªcients from earnings equations and thus decomposition results. In the absence of any credible exogenous instrument in the data, we proceeded without corrections for selection bias. In any case, our decomposition ªndings are robust to changes in both speciªcation and estimation methods. 23 However, it should be stressed that, although labor was administratively allocated in China up to 1995 and labor mobility remained quite low until this date, selection may deªnitely be a more important issue in 2002. While the development of the labor market has allowed mobility to increase, SOE restructuring has led to a selective laying off of workers. Our dynamic interpretations in terms of segmentation changes might thus be partly driven by selection mechanisms.
Decomposition: Path dependence A general issue concerning Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions concerns path dependence (Fournier 2005) . Indeed, evaluated effects a priori depend on the benchmark population structure or coefªcient vector chosen to run microsimulations. In our work, each possible evaluation is considered and used as a robustness test for our decomposition results. 24 Moreover, since decomposition results obtained from this type of analysis strongly depend on estimation quality, a bootstrap procedure has been implemented over the whole procedure (estimation, simulation, and decomposition). 25 The decomposition tables in the following section include the corresponding 95 percent conªdence intervals.
Decomposing the evolution of earnings differentials by categories
Tables 10, 11, and 12 document the changes in relative remuneration across enterprises of different ownership/sector/region in urban China, by applying the extended Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method presented above. Differentials are reported both in mean value and in percentage of the lowest earnings, the asterisks indicating the statistical signiªcance of estimated effects. For example, the "Endowment effect" ªgures reported in the ªrst row of In particular, results obtained through the two-step method proposed by Dubin and McFadden (1984) , with sector choice and enterprise choice modeled as multinomial logit and local shares of employment in various sectors used as instruments, led to similar results for all aspects considered in this paper.
24 Each effect can be evaluated in six different ways, depending on the choice of reference populations and coefªcient vectors as well as on the choice of the sequence in which different effects are evaluated.
25 By resampling from the original data, the nonparametric boostrap method allows for the derivation of conªdence intervals for all statistics obtained through the microsimulation procedure presented above. 
Note: See table 10 and text for a full definition of regions.
things being equal, to a 7 percent average earnings gap against UCEs (instead of the 27 percent observed differential).
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Ownership structure
In the ªrst column of Table 10 , observed earnings differences across enterprises of various ownership types show a general increasing trend between 1995 and 2002, the only (noteworthy) exception being that between FIEs and GAIs. 27 The evolution has been in favor of both FIEs and GAIs, and at the expense of UCEs. In the middle, employees in SOEs have seen their earnings gap increase compared to those in UCEs, but their situation has deteriorated compared to those in GAIs. The most striking result from table 10 is the growing importance (and signiªcance) of segmentation as the most prominent explanatory factor for the general increasing trend in earnings differences across ownership.
Earnings differentials in favor of the foreign sector in 1995 have increased over time compared to the emerging domestic private sector, but decreased compared to the public sector. The deteriorating position of FIEs as compared to GAIs mainly comes from changing segmentation patterns (from 14 percent in favor of FIEs to a nonsigniªcant 5 percent in favor of GAIs), although a longer working time in FIEs gives them a premium over GAIs (5 percent In 1995, the earnings differential between the public sector and urban collectives was all in favor of the former (27 percent for SOEs and 37 percent for GAIs) and was explained by the conjunction of both better endowments of workers in the public sector and a rather strong segmentation against urban collectives (respectively, 17 and 27 percent). Interestingly, the huge increase in the earnings gap between GAIs and UCEs over time (reaching 78 percent in 2002) can be attributed to a much stronger segmentation (65 percent), but also, and rather importantly, to a widening gap in terms of workers' endowments, with an increase of the wage premium due to better characteristics from 9 percent to 18 percent. On the other hand, changes in hours worked are reducing the gap in 2002 between UCEs and both SOEs and GAIs, but with quite a small impact (respectively, 3 percent and 6 percent).
In 2002, the comparison between PIEs and the public sector also shows high earnings differentials against PIEs, the premium in favor of the public sector ranging from 31 percent to 64 percent. Again, these gaps are driven by a strong segmentation phenomenon (50-78 percent), which cannot be compensated for by longer hours worked in the private sector, though this last effect is quite high and signiªcant (18-21 percent).
The decomposition analysis presented here highlights three main phenomena on the ownership dimension, which are of importance for understanding the evolution of the labor market in urban China. First, workers in the public sector, especially government agencies and institutions, are still very much privileged as compared to those in other segments of the labor market. Second, the foreign sector has reinforced its position through a sustained high-wage policy. Third, the emerging domestic private sector and the collective sector have seen their relative positions deteriorating. These results show that despite the increasing importance of market mechanisms within the private sector, active policies launched at the end of the 1990s to raise government wages have had a strong impact in terms of segmentation, which conªrms that earnings in the public sector remain highly protected. It should be stressed that there might also be a sizeable selection effect at stake here, since the downsizing of the state sector has led to the privatization of the least dynamic enterprises, with the Chinese authorities still controlling large proªt-making SOEs, where employees remain strongly protected.
Economic sectors
The decomposition results by economic sectors presented in table 11 also highlight quite a strong and rising segmentation between competitive and protected sectors. In 1995, segmentation against the competitive sectors contributed to more than half of the total average earnings differences. In 2002, the main reason that the competitive sectors provided much lower wages than the rest of the sectors (between 48 percent and 63 percent) almost exclusively comes from the segmentation effect, which is strongly reinforced as compared to 1995 and ranges from 50 percent to 64 percent.
By the end of the 1990s, SOEs began to retreat from the competitive sector, while strengthening their position in noncompetitive sectors, especially in the oligopolistic sector. SOEs' downsizing and massive layoffs are the main reasons for the surge in unemployment at the end of the 1990s, but our decompositions indicate no change in terms of the relative wage level for the remaining employees in the oligopolistic sector. The comparison between the competitive sector and the oligopolistic sector even reveals no signiªcant differences in workers' characteristics, with the only determinant explaining the large difference being the segmentation effect.
These ªndings can be analyzed in terms of proªt sharing within oligopolistic sectors (Li and Bai 2005; Knight and Li 2005) . Moreover, institutional explanations lie in the increased autonomy in wage setting and increased wages for civil servants provided by the Chinese government over the period. This has allowed the oligopolistic sector and public services to redistribute rents to employees, while the competitive sector has been facing growing competition.
Not only the wage level, but also working hours, have changed under the pressure of competition. During the period, working time has increased in the competitive sectors, while at the same time the noncompetitive sectors have somewhat reduced their working hours. Given this differentiated evolution, changes in hours worked are partly hiding the magnitude of the evolution. Indeed, if workers in the competitive sectors were not working longer, the observed differences of 48 percent to 63 percent would be even larger, by 8 to 10 percentage points. Hence, if there were no segmentation and only differences in the hours worked, the earnings level for similar workers in competitive sectors would be higher than those in the oligopolistic sectors, and quite close to those in public services and government jobs.
Within the noncompetitive sector, observed earnings differences also turned larger in 2002. For both years, endowments in the oligopolistic sector are slightly lower than in the other two sectors. This is especially the case for the comparison with public services, in which endowments (5-9 percent) are signiªcantly higher than in the oligopolistic sector and drive a major part of the observed earnings gap (6-10 percent). Antithetically, public services show small endowment differences with the government sector in 1995, but beneªt from a favorable segmentation effect (6 percent), which grew even larger in 2002 (13 percent). This somewhat surprising segmentation phenomenon may be explained by the fact that in public services, wages are derived partly from the government and partly from the market. The marketization of this sector has allowed workers in public services to receive rising extrawage income (bonus, subsidy, etc.) on top of wages provided by the government.
The sector decomposition conªrms and completes some of the ªndings from the ownership analysis, with a rising segmentation over 1995-2002 in favor of the noncompetitive sectors. Three facts can be highlighted here to explain observed earnings differences and evolutions over the period studied: (1) increasing competition within the competitive sector, (2) increasing concentration of large SOEs within oligopolistic sectors, and (3) increasing protection of government jobs.
Regional segmentation
Consistent with the ªndings in regard to the other two dimensions, regional decompositions show a trend of rising segmentation (table 12) . Regional disparities, especially between coastal provinces and other regions, remain large, with the highest gap still being close to 40 percent in 2002. A sizeable part of the observed earnings gap between regions can be attributed to a more rapid economic growth and huge capital inºow in the coastal region and to inadequate labor mobility between regions. As illustrated in many studies (e.g., Knight and Yueh 2006) , labor mobility was still limited for urban local workers subject to various institutional obstacles even at the end of 1990s, while regional mobility among rural migrant workers increased over time. Table 12 shows that the share of regional differences resulting from segmentation, particularly between the coastal region and other regions, was remarkably large in the two years and became stronger in almost each pair of regions. Segmentation explains the major part of the observed earnings difference between the coastal and central region (35-41 percent) , between the coastal and western region (28 percent), and between the coastal and northeast region (40-41 percent).
A remarkable change between 1995 and 2002 is the deteriorating relative position of central provinces. This change may be rooted in the fact that the region has been disregarded in the central government's strategy of regional development. However, despite declining relative earnings and increasing segmentation against workers in the region, central provinces have improved their relative position in terms of endowment in 2002. All endowment effects against central provinces in 1995 (ranging from 2 to 15 percent) reversed or became no longer signiªcant in 2002. This may be because skilled and well-educated laid-off workers from closed SOEs had to take jobs that were previously ªlled by unskilled and poorly educated workers. The better-endowed people remained active, while low-endowed people were forced to exit the labor market.
On the opposite, the position of the western region in terms of segmentation improved somewhat between 1995 and 2002. One possible interpretation is that the Western Development Strategy has raised the relative level of earnings in western provinces, allowing them to maintain their relative position with respect to coastal provinces (around 30 percent earnings gap) in a context of growing regional segmentation.
The northeastern provinces, represented by Liaoning, deserve special attention. The relative earnings in the northeast region slightly decreased compared to those in other regions except municipalities between 1995 and 2002, which is reºected in rising observed earnings gaps between the northeast region and other regions. Concerning segmentation phenomena, the evidence is mixed: stable segmentation in favor of coastal provinces (40-41 percent), western provinces (10-11 percent), and municipalities (17-20 percent) on one hand, and decreasing segmentation in favor of central provinces (7 percent in 1995 to nonsigniªcant in 2002) on the other hand. This pattern can be at least partly explained by a declining endowment effect against the northeast region due to selection mechanisms. With the massive layoffs and closures of some large-scale enterprises, the absence of local re-employment opportunities caused better-educated employees (e.g., professionals, technicians, and skilled workers) to move to other provinces.
Regional decompositions provide further evidence of rising segmentation on China's urban labor market and complement the other two dimensions by highlighting quite large regional disparities and the unequal distribution of gains or burdens related to changes in the labor market at the turn of the century. They also stress the importance of the Chinese government's regional policies in alleviating burdens in some regions (e.g., western provinces) and redistributing the beneªts of economic development. In this context, central provinces appear to be by far the greatest (relative) losers in the recent reform process, facing increasing segmentation, even as compared to western and northeastern provinces.
Conclusion
This paper analyzes the evolution of labor market segmentation for urban hukou holders between 1995 and 2002. During the seven-year period, real earnings in urban China increased sharply (78 percent) and for all workers, with substantial differences across ownership and sectors, and to a lesser extent, regions. As a result, earn-ings differentials across enterprises have changed dramatically and sometimes induced a reranking.
Our decomposition results show strong evidence of a multitiered labor market along three major lines, with segmentation arising across enterprise ownership (up to 78 percent), economic sectors (up to 64 percent), and regions (up to 41 percent). They also highlight increasing segmentation over time within each of these three dimensions. In particular, the gap between the privileged segments of the labor market (e.g., SOEs and oligopolitistic sectors) and the most competitive segments (e.g., private enterprises and competitive sectors) widened between 1995 and 2002. Our results conªrm the Knight and Song (2003) ªndings that "the market forces operating in the growing private sector and the relative immunity of the state sector from those forces generated greater wage segmentation among types of ownership [between 1995 and 1999] , and provincial differences in the pace of reform and in economic growth created spatial segmentation in wages that could not be removed by the equilibrating movement of labor" (616).
In view of the massive layoffs in the state-owned sector at the end of the 1990s and the concomitant impressive growth of the private sector, one might have expected segmentation not to increase so sharply given the growing importance of market mechanisms and competition in the urban labor market. However, the clear distinction found between a "protected" well-paying segment and a "competitive" segment mostly made of the emerging private sector stresses a strongly segmented labor market in 2002. More speciªcally, our ªndings suggest that there are two directions toward which the urban labor market in China is moving. On one hand, economic liberalization has brought various beneªts to the labor system, including better signals for a more efªcient allocation of labor and improved incentives for efforts thanks to enhanced rewards to effort. On the other hand, various institutional as well as market-based elements have prevented equalization of marginal products, and thus reduction in earning differences. Major explanations for the strong and rising magnitude of segmentation between 1995 and 2002 can be found in migration restrictions and in active government policies toward the public sector, but also in efªciency-wage-related behavior in the foreign sector.
The observed increasing spatial segmentation reºects the still extremely low mobility of labor among urban dwellers, which represents a major obstacle to the establishment of competitive market wages in urban areas. Even though regional mobility for rural-urban migrant workers has increased over time and the effectiveness of institutional barriers such as the hukou system has progressively declined, various institutional obstacles remained to labor mobility for urban residents even at the end of the 1990s. As a result, market mechanisms favoring wage convergence could not operate properly. The evidence found here supports Knight and Song's (2005) ªndings of a "three-tier" labor market in 1999, which consisted of "privileged" urban residents never laid off during the SOEs' downsizing process, retrenched urban workers, and rural-urban migrants. The upper segment was employees in the public sector and/or the oligopolistic sectors, while the second segment was consistent with a more competitive private sector characterized by short-term contracts and by downward pressures on wages coming from the third segment (the rural-urban migrants). It must be remembered that our empirical analysis is based only on data collected for urban hukou holders, that is, local urban residents. Consequently, it does not encompass the whole labor market in cities where huge inºows of ruralurban migrants are potentially key components of the urban labor market.
Contrary to European economies in transition, where studies have found a wage premium in favor of the private sector after economic liberalization (Adamchick and Bedi 2000; Lokshin and Jovanovic 2003) , our results highlight earnings differences in favor of the public sector in China after workers' characteristics and working time are controlled for. Hence, even during the most recent period, the Chinese government has kept its inºuence on the urban labor market through wage income increases for civil servants and by maintaining the relative income of workers in SOEs, as well as by targeting speciªc provinces. Compared to governments of European economies in transition, the Chinese government has taken active policies through wage adjustments to narrow the income gap between civil servants and white-collar workers employed in the nonpublic sector and thus keep skilled workers in the public sector. In this respect, the observed segmentation structure helps the public sector to retain skilled workers. It also reduces incentives for moonlighting and thus compromising the overall efªciency of the public sector, which has been observed in Poland and Yugoslavia (Adamchick and Bedi 2000; Lokshin and Jovanovic 2003) .
The existence of segmentation in the labor market may also be interpreted in terms of efªciency wage theory, especially for the comparison between FIEs and domestic (public and private) enterprises, and to some extent between coastal provinces and other regions. In this line of thought, higher earnings received in FIEs may be interpreted as means to facilitate workers' cooperation, to boost their effort intensity, and more generally, to improve the average quality of job applicants. Since FIEs in China face greater difªculties in employee supervision due to language barriers and cultural differences, they may be willing to pay wages above market rates to solve part of these difªculties and to protect their investment in employees' screening, hiring, and training. Following this approach, economic liberalization and growing market participation may be consistent with the payment of wages exceeding a pure competitive level.
If these two last points may provide some economic rationale for high and even rising segmentation, increasing segmentation associated with a nonuniform move of enterprises toward the payment of competitive market wages may yield further sources of income inequality. Indeed, evidence shows that during the seven-year period, the structure of wages became more unequal. 28 As highlighted by Khan and Riskin (2005) , the concentration ratio for urban wages increased by 68 percent between 1995 and 2002. Our results conªrm this trend and the potential perverse effects of a multitiered urban labor market on income inequality.
Finally, there are good reasons to believe that the observed increasing segmentation may be only a temporary phenomenon. Indeed, given the process of SOEs' downsizing, ownership structure may lose importance in the end. At the same time, the growing importance of the private sector might be expected to put more pressure on the urban labor market in the future by bringing in stronger competition and challenging the privileged situation of employees in the public and oligopolistic sectors. Similarly, population movements across provinces and regions are also on the rise and may rebalance regional disparities in the end.
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